@Phil @realcaseyrollins @diego The biggest bully in public affairs I have ever encountered is the current US administration. And believe me, I mean to smack back in any way I can.
Our trading partners have not been bullies, even though we have allowed ourselves to — it was always under our control, Dorothy! — to trade with them on foolish terms.
@Phil @realcaseyrollins @diego Developed countries tariff one another very little, until now. Tariffs extraordinary limited role should be sectoral, not country by country. It might (usually not, but it’s not incoherent) make sense to, say, tariff batteries to protect an infant industry in the US. (Subsidies are usually preferable.) Bilateral tariffs make basically no sense, basically ever.
@Phil @realcaseyrollins @diego The US did not have a near monopoly on anything during the period. If it had it would have been in large *surplus*, producing for the whole world, rather than in balance.
Between 1945-1950 that was roughly the case, but not afterward, 1950-1983, when US trade basically balanced.
@Phil @realcaseyrollins @diego Mistaken people have been making the same mistakes for a very long time.
(Except, despite their mistaken reasoning, this administration may make their alarmist predictions come true after all, by themselves wrecking what they had predicted would fail.)
@Phil @realcaseyrollins @diego It’s not very hard to impose capital controls. China has done it for decades. There’s nothing impractical about imposing balance via the capital account unless you are ideologically attached to “free movement of capital”.
@Phil @realcaseyrollins @diego I’ve proposed mechanisms to address balance sanely for years. As have many others. It’s a fair cop the politics have been hard. Maybe this administration was, finally, an opportunity to do the right thing.
Then, oops. In its blinkered furor, its eagerness to scapegoat, its disdain for considered action rather than gut decisionmaking, it may have discredited the cause of balance for generations.
@Phil @realcaseyrollins @diego For Christ sake, read a little bit. I just linked to a mechanism, a foreign payouts tax:
The entire Bretton Woods order that prevailed from 1945 through the early 1970s was a mechanism.
Your movement is not “smacking back” because we need to. It is smacking back because it is full of people who like to smack.
@Phil @realcaseyrollins @diego The dollar was not on remotely a path toward collapse until your movement put it there. Sure, a dollar has lost a lot of value over the last hundred years, if you kept it in a mattress. If you put it anywhere else — earned short-term, credit and interest-rate risk free Treasury bill rates — its value has increased.
From me, https://www.interfluidity.com/uploads/2017/10/Fiat-Is-Effective-Minitalk-light-edit-to-share.pdf 1/
@Phil @realcaseyrollins @diego It’s true that there’s a strong case for keeping trade in general in overall balance, though there are reasons for time-limited exceptions.
I’ve spent the last month making that case:
https://drafts.interfluidity.com/2025/04/20/keynesian-compromise/index.html 2/
@Phil @realcaseyrollins @diego As I have for many years.
https://www.interfluidity.com/v2/540.html
3/
@Phil @realcaseyrollins @diego But there is no coherent case for insisting upon and imposing *bilateral* rather than *overall* trade balance. Which is what this administration has absurdly, destructively, I’m sorry but stupidly, tried to impose. 4/
@Phil @realcaseyrollins @diego The United States should broadly buy roughly as much as it sells. It matters not a whit if it buys more from Lesotho than it sells to Lesotho as long as it sells to somebody else more than it buys from them. 5/
@Phil @realcaseyrollins @diego The overwhelming majority of ways the world could be in overall balance — all countries in overall balance — involve a lot of offsetting bilateral trade imbalances. That is the space we want markets to explore and optimize over. Insisting on bilateral balance between all countries is the international equivalent of barter. You only trade where there is a double coincidence of wants. 6/
@Phil @realcaseyrollins @diego But the Trump Administration wants to personalize international trade into trade partners taking advantage, or ripping us off, when the only party that could have intervened to insure the US remained in overall balance was the US itself, and it would not have been hard, we just didn’t want to do it, persuaded ourselves (wrongly!) that we shouldn’t. 7/
@Phil @realcaseyrollins @diego So it destroys friendships and alliances, and takes down the US economy, by idiotically deploying tariffs intended to immediately bring all trading relationships into bilateral balance. 8/
@Phil @realcaseyrollins @diego If what you want is a world of overall-balanced trade (which you should!), you should be perfectly comfortable with BRICs-ish diversification from the dollar as reserve currency to a wider basket of reserve assets. 9/
@Phil @realcaseyrollins @diego If a single issuer (think country) is to be the reserve currency provider, then it *must* run a current-account (usually trade) deficit, in order to supply the world with the reserve asset it demands.
I suspect you’ve encountered it. This is known as the Triffin Dilemma https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Triffin_dilemma?wprov=sfti1# 10/
@Phil @realcaseyrollins @diego My view is that the benefit of a world with overall balanced trade outweighs the benefit to the US of trying to maintain a near monopoly on reserve asset provision, so I prefer we go for overall balance rather than continue to run large deficits to supply the world with dollars. /fin
it’s true a “deep state” means the ship of state turns slowly, acts as a kind of low-pass filter on the effect of political decision making and remaking, and therefore in a certain sense “restrains democracy”. 1/
but it also helps immunize the polity from the consequences of political noise, short-lived passions, momentary errors, accidentally electing a mad king. 2/
genuine democracies don’t naively presume that popular passions are always perfect. they build institutions that give effect to values and interests durably expressed by the public, but frustrate controversial sharp turns unless they persist or recruit broad consensus. 3/
with apologies to Mencken, democracy is not when the people get what they want good and hard, but when government is responsive to the people but able to distinguish signal from noise, without any king or higher authority arrogating the role of deciding what’s signal. 4/
it’s the institution. /fin
existence is inconceivable, but so is its alternative.
@admitsWrongIfProven well, there might still be time!
@diego okay. but political consensus in the US would be badly shaken by a stock market crash, which even people who have little understanding of the stock market know is a disruptive event that reflects and portends economic difficulty.
but in fact, stock market fluctuations are far less dangerous than what’s happening to the dollar, US Treasury bonds, and gold.
it’s less costly, but more politically salient, so a useful signal.
@realcaseyrollins no, i’m not referring at all to quantitative easing, which is at this point ordinary and nondisruptive. i’m referring to madly scribbling and rescribbling tariffs, negotiating in ways that even usually reserved allies describe as extortion, generally behaving in ways that abruptly convince the rest of the world they don’t want to hold US paper. that might be good for trade balance, could even drive us into surplus! but via a miserably disruptive path.
it would be better if the stock market crashes us into a consensus to impeach and remove before the dollar and US Treasuries are permanently discredited.
@akkartik @haitchfive @coaxial you enforce balance on the financial side, not the goods side. you make it expensive for people to hold your country’s paper (treasuries, private debt, stock, whatever). so exporters, who initially earn paper, are incentivized to redeem them back for goods and services. 1/
@akkartik @haitchfive @coaxial you don’t discriminate between countries or goods (while enforcing balance, there may be other industrial-policy / resilience / national-security overlays to consider). unbalanced trade is paid for with promises. let markets decide what it’s important to buy and sell. 2/
@akkartik @haitchfive @coaxial but if foreigners (in aggregate, swapping amongst themselves) won’t hold your paper in great quantities or for very long, then what you can buy will be tethered closely to what you sell. 3/
@akkartik @haitchfive @coaxial (a party that sells to you, holds paper briefly, then directly or swapping to some other party buys stuff back from you with your own paper should be experience very little penalty. a party that holds your paper should bear a penalty proportional to time. that’s what a “foreign payouts tax” delivers. transactional lending to lubricate commerce is fine. portfolio accumulation, long-term holdings, are penalized.) /fin
if AI writes the law, what was the legislative intent?
[new draft post] Keynesian compromise https://drafts.interfluidity.com/2025/04/20/keynesian-compromise/index.html
@haitchfive @akkartik insisting on bilateral balance becomes similar to barter. countries can only trade when they have a double coincidence of wants.
imposing an overall near-balance constraint for each country with rest-of-world adds a huge range of degrees of freedom, ways markets can discover to, say, buy semiconductors from taiwan and sell coffee to australia which sells iron to taiwan, etc.
it's weird that about the same time of year jews and christians celebrate the unrisen and risen respectively.
@akkartik I really should have re-emphasized the point in this one… in my head they're a series but it's been almost three weeks, so several mayfly lifetimes.
