Steve Randy Waldman
@interfluidity.com

RoW ex-China is likely to be unproblematically aligned on low trade barriers. Yes, before all this, there was a significantly likelihood that eg Europe would put up barriers to China, perhaps in concert with a saner US. They still might. 1/

in reply to this
Steve Randy Waldman
@interfluidity.com

But China, especially ex-US demand, is a massive potential source of disinflation. So if RoW-ex-China wants to avoid recession, it can modulate barriers with China to that end. 2/

in reply to self
Steve Randy Waldman
@interfluidity.com

For example, the EU might put up sizable barriers to, say, auto imports, where they have an incumbent industry they wish to preserve, and perhaps overcapacity due to limited US demand. 3/

in reply to self
Steve Randy Waldman
@interfluidity.com

But most of what China produces Europe does not have an immediate need to protect. Like Biden's US, over a medium term, EU may be interested in more diversified sourcing for a variety of important industries. But that won't require precipitous imposition of barriers into the teeth of a crisis. 4/

in reply to self
Steve Randy Waldman
@interfluidity.com

So what I'd advise e.g. European countries would be very narrow, perhaps steep, barriers to China in strategic industries, but otherwise openness through the adjustment period. The EU can afford an overall trade deficit at little meaningful cost, as long as its key industries are protected. 5/

in reply to self
Steve Randy Waldman
@interfluidity.com

After the storm, they can go back to what we and they were working on before, more diversified and resilient supply, and more tools to nudge toward overall balance, without breaking the global trade system. 6/

in reply to self
Steve Randy Waldman
@interfluidity.com

Those are important but less urgent projects. /fin

in reply to self