@realcaseyrollins@social.teci.world @AltonDooley @realcaseyrollins@noauthority.social @volkris @Hyolobrika First, thank you for saying so, and I do apologize for getting exasperated. I promise that whatever I am doing, I am not arguing in bad faith. I have been in a crisis since last Monday, and my family might well end up emigrating because of this decision. Now let me address your counter. 1/
@realcaseyrollins@social.teci.world @AltonDooley @realcaseyrollins@noauthority.social @volkris @Hyolobrika In the decision there is actually an argument among the conservatives, between Amy Coney Barrett and John Roberts, on just this point. Coney Barrett dissents in part, specifically on the excluding motives part. She uses the example of bribery, quid pro quo. She asks, suppose a President is bribed to pardon. Pardons are within the "conclusive and preclusive" powers of the President. 2/
@realcaseyrollins@social.teci.world @AltonDooley @realcaseyrollins@noauthority.social @volkris @Hyolobrika So a pardon, per se, can never be a crime. But accepting a bribe to produce one certainly is. It's *quid pro quo*. ACB points out that we might see the *quid* (someone gave the President money), but unless the *pro* is established, it's not a bribe. 3/
@realcaseyrollins@social.teci.world @AltonDooley @realcaseyrollins@noauthority.social @volkris @Hyolobrika If examining the motivation for a pardon is out of bounds, how can you establish a connection between the *quid* and the *quo*? Again, a pardon alone is under the President's absolute discretion, can never be a crime in and of itself. So without motive, could the prohibition against bribing for a pardon ever be enforced? 4/
@realcaseyrollins@social.teci.world @AltonDooley @realcaseyrollins@noauthority.social @volkris @Hyolobrika Roberts — extremely unpersuasively in my view — answers that the pardon itself is a public act. So, for example, if the wife of a Federal prisoner gave a big sum to a President or to his campaign, and then that prisoner was pardoned, perhaps that would be enough? 5/
@realcaseyrollins@social.teci.world @AltonDooley @realcaseyrollins@noauthority.social @volkris @Hyolobrika Perhaps we can agree that is unpersuasive, because perhaps we have a shared low opinion of Bill Clinton and his ethics. 6/
screenshot from https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bill_Clinton_pardon_controversy
Text: In particular, Clinton's pardon of Marc Rich, a fugitive from justice whose ex-wife made substantial donations to the Clinton Presidential Center and Hillary Clinton's campaign for the U.S. Senate, was investigated by federal prosecutor Mary Jo White. She was later replaced by Republican James Comey, who found no illegality on Clinton's part.
@realcaseyrollins@social.teci.world @AltonDooley @realcaseyrollins@noauthority.social @volkris @Hyolobrika We already know, I think, that the mere public act of a pardon subsequent to some nice "donations" is insufficient in practice to establish a bribe. In fact, this Supreme Court has dramatically tightened standards, clarified that only a clear quid-pro-quo is actionable, outright legalized after-the-fact gratuities to state and local officials. 7/
@realcaseyrollins@social.teci.world @AltonDooley @realcaseyrollins@noauthority.social @volkris @Hyolobrika Note that neither Amy Coney Barrett nor John Roberts relied upon the possibility that motive might leak. Evidence of motive (I think!) already exists in Jack Smith's case against Trump. The Court does not consider it, I think because it's now inadmissible, under the may-not-inquire-into-motives standard. 8/
@realcaseyrollins@social.teci.world @AltonDooley @realcaseyrollins@noauthority.social @volkris @Hyolobrika But suppose evidence of motive was just brazenly public? A whistle-blower leaks a memo to the New York Times, in which a President (idiotically) instructs a pardon be issued in consideration of the spouse's loyal financial support. 9/
@realcaseyrollins@social.teci.world @AltonDooley @realcaseyrollins@noauthority.social @volkris @Hyolobrika I don't think, under this decision, that changes anything. The Court may not inquire. To bring a public New York Times article into evidence, for the prosecutor to subpoena from the Times a copy, to validate it by interviewing and examining its author or the reporter would be the court inquiring into motive. 10/
@realcaseyrollins@social.teci.world @AltonDooley @realcaseyrollins@noauthority.social @volkris @Hyolobrika And without some degree of validation, some degree of "inquiry", even what is fully public can only be rumor and hearsay to a court of law. I don't think the court would be able to take into account information about motive that "everybody knows", because converting common knowledge to vetted evidence would be an inquiry to far. 11/
@realcaseyrollins@social.teci.world @AltonDooley @realcaseyrollins@noauthority.social @volkris @Hyolobrika John Roberts seems to suggest that at least conjectures or allegations about motive might have a role (how else could the mere public act of a pardon become the *quo* of quid-pro-quo?), but i think a plain reading of "courts may not inquire into the President's motives" would also prohibit entertaining conjectures and allegations about motive. 12/
@realcaseyrollins@social.teci.world @AltonDooley @realcaseyrollins@noauthority.social @volkris @Hyolobrika And even if it did not, how could mere conjecture and allegation form the basis of any criminal prosecution? /fin
@realcaseyrollins@social.teci.world @AltonDooley @realcaseyrollins@noauthority.social @volkris @Hyolobrika You also wonder, what if it's not a leak, what if the President himself states his motive on the public record somehow? Could courts at least use that, in deciding whether an act was an official act?
I don't know! 1a/
@realcaseyrollins@social.teci.world @AltonDooley @realcaseyrollins@noauthority.social @volkris @Hyolobrika The way I characterize this decision is not that it's automatic immunity for anything a President does. Trump, if he loses the election, might still be on the hook, because some of the allegations against him involve actions that may well be unofficial acts. 2a/
@realcaseyrollins@social.teci.world @AltonDooley @realcaseyrollins@noauthority.social @volkris @Hyolobrika What the decision is is a *roadmap* to Presidents who want to break the law and get away with it. It's fine to instruct your Attorney General to gin up a prosecution against a political opponent. Your discussions and prosecutorial decisions have absolute immunity. 2b/
@realcaseyrollins@social.teci.world @AltonDooley @realcaseyrollins@noauthority.social @volkris @Hyolobrika Even with several of your too-charitable-I-think reading of a limitation in the taking-Care clause, there'd be no way to demonstrate that the prosecutorial decisionmaking was out of bounds without any ability of courts to inquire into motive, even when there is a credible allegation of lawbreaking. 2c/
@realcaseyrollins@social.teci.world @AltonDooley @realcaseyrollins@noauthority.social @volkris @Hyolobrika But Presidents can still do stupid stuff and get in trouble. If the President instructed his driver to mow down a Congressperson he disliked, Courts would probably pretty easily find that an unofficial act. 2d/
@realcaseyrollins@social.teci.world @AltonDooley @realcaseyrollins@noauthority.social @volkris @Hyolobrika Openly confessing a corrupt motive for actions that would otherwise enjoy immunity I think falls into that category. Yes, there are still ways that a President can be stupid or careless and shed His immunity. But the decision presents a clear roadmap, which if followed, permits a President to act very flexibly without deference to general law, with no way for Congress to regulate or the courts to hold accountable. /2fin
@realcaseyrollins@social.teci.world @AltonDooley @realcaseyrollins@noauthority.social @volkris @Hyolobrika So. Much of the decision concerns the distinction between official and unofficial acts. If the President's prosecutions are not in fact to "take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed", in pursuit of violators of law, then you might argue they are not "official acts" at all, and there is no immunity for whatever a President does that is not an official act. 1/
@realcaseyrollins@social.teci.world @AltonDooley @realcaseyrollins@noauthority.social @volkris @Hyolobrika Suppose some prosecution is somehow established not be consistent with "tak[ing] Care that the Laws be faithfully executed". Would instructing an AG to pursue that constitute an official act because it takes the form of an official act (the President instructing a subordinate officer), or by virtue of its deviation from constitutional authority, could be deemed an unofficial act? I don't think the decision is clear. But. 2/
@realcaseyrollins@social.teci.world @AltonDooley @realcaseyrollins@noauthority.social @volkris @Hyolobrika But. The decision is very clear about how one might — or really might not! — establish that an act is not an official act. Let me show you another screenshot. 3/
Text" In dividing official from unofficial conduct, courts may not inquire into the President’s motives. Such an inquiry would risk exposing even the most obvious instances of of- ficial conduct to judicial examination on the mere allegation of improper purpose, thereby intruding on the Article II in- terests that immunity seeks to protect. Indeed, “[i]t would seriously cripple the proper and effective administration of public affairs as entrusted to the executive branch of the government” if “[ijn exercising the functions of his office,” the President was “under an apprehension that the motives that control his official conduct may, at any time, become the subject of inquiry.” Fitzgerald, 457 U. S., at 745 (quot- ing Spalding v. Vilas, 161 U. S. 483, 498 (1896)). We thus rejected such inquiries in Fitzgerald. The plaintiff there contended that he was dismissed from the Air Force for re- taliatory reasons. See 457 U. S., at 733-741, 756... (truncated due to character limits) Nor may courts deem an action unofficial merely because it allegedly violates a generally applicable law.
@realcaseyrollins@social.teci.world @AltonDooley @realcaseyrollins@noauthority.social @volkris @Hyolobrika Let's emphasize.
1. "In dividing official from unofficial conduct, courts may not inquire into the President's motives."
2. "Nor may courts deem an action unofficial merely because it allegedly violates a generally applicable law." 4/
@realcaseyrollins@social.teci.world @AltonDooley @realcaseyrollins@noauthority.social @volkris @Hyolobrika So.
Suppose you take the most charitable read of the text we discussed before, and claim that a prosecution that had no basis in "tak[ing] Care that the Law be faithfully executed" would be render it an unofficial act, despite appearing from the outside every bit like an official act. 5/
@realcaseyrollins@social.teci.world @AltonDooley @realcaseyrollins@noauthority.social @volkris @Hyolobrika Then for a court to touch the President for that out-of-bounds prosecution, it would have to somehow be established that what appears to be a valid prosecution, based as all prosecutions are on an allegation that the law was violated, is not in fact that. 6/
@realcaseyrollins@social.teci.world @AltonDooley @realcaseyrollins@noauthority.social @volkris @Hyolobrika How, without "inquir[ing] into the President's motives" can you establish that the alleged violation of the law is not only baseless (thin prosecutions happen sometimes, that can't render a prosecution unofficial) but malicious? 7/
@realcaseyrollins@social.teci.world @AltonDooley @realcaseyrollins@noauthority.social @volkris @Hyolobrika Even if you can credibly allege some violation of law by which the President is still ostensibly bound — perhaps the President was bribed to prosecute someone! — that can't weigh into the determination. You can't examine motive, and you can't examine a role in some larger crime. 8/
@realcaseyrollins@social.teci.world @AltonDooley @realcaseyrollins@noauthority.social @volkris @Hyolobrika If you want to read a limitation in the "tak[ing] Care" clause — a reading the decision does not support, because it grants Trump absolute immunity without suggesting the actions he is accused of fall anywhere near inside the "tak[ing] Care" clause — how in practical terms could you demonstrate that the prosecution was an "unofficial act", without inquiring into motive? /fin
@realcaseyrollins@social.teci.world @AltonDooley @realcaseyrollins@noauthority.social @volkris @Hyolobrika ("Nor may courts deem an action unofficial merely because it allegedly violates a generally applicable law." is perhaps responsive to some of @volkris's suggestions of where a limitation might emerge, very early in this thread.)
@realcaseyrollins@social.teci.world @AltonDooley @realcaseyrollins@noauthority.social @volkris @Hyolobrika When the first screenshot (regarding prosecutions and the Attorney General) refers to prosecutorial decisions, it refers to all actions by the President with respect to prosecutorial decisions. It is not clear to me whether that would bring in prosecutorial decisions by, say, a DA making those decisions on his own. Those might or might not still be regulable! 1/
@realcaseyrollins@social.teci.world @AltonDooley @realcaseyrollins@noauthority.social @volkris @Hyolobrika But the text is quite clear that a President's actions with respect to prosecutions and prosecutorial decisionmaking, including and discussion or instruction He gives directly to subordinates, is within the special domain, the sphere of "conclusive and preclusive" authority that is beyond Congress and the courts. /fin
@realcaseyrollins@social.teci.world @AltonDooley @realcaseyrollins@noauthority.social @volkris @Hyolobrika See the screenshot just added. Once the Court determines something is a "conclusive and preclusive" Constitutional authority, Congress is disabled from acting upon it, and the Courts have no power over it. The first screenshot we discussed (which comes later in the decision than the second) places prosecutorial decisions among "conclusive and preclusive" Constitutional authorities.
@realcaseyrollins@social.teci.world @AltonDooley @realcaseyrollins@noauthority.social @volkris @Hyolobrika I'm adding the second screenshot again, because it seems to be diverted from the thread.
![Text:
No matter the context, the President’s authority to act necessarily “stem[s] either from an act of Congress or from the Constitution itself.” Youngstown, 343 U. S., at 585. In the latter case, the President’s authority is sometimes “con- clusive and preclusive.” Id., at 638 (Jackson, dJ., concur- ring). When the President exercises such authority, he may act even when the measures he takes are “incompatible with the expressed or implied will of Congress.” Id., at 637. The exclusive constitutional authority of the President “dis- abl[es] the Congress from acting upon the subject.” Id., at 637-638. And the courts have “no power to control [the President’s] discretion” when he acts pursuant to the pow- ers invested exclusively in him by the Constitution. Mar- bury, 1 Cranch, at 166.](media_attachments/files/112/754/146/546/289/487/original/0cbb68f22c519faf.png)
Text: No matter the context, the President’s authority to act necessarily “stem[s] either from an act of Congress or from the Constitution itself.” Youngstown, 343 U. S., at 585. In the latter case, the President’s authority is sometimes “con- clusive and preclusive.” Id., at 638 (Jackson, dJ., concur- ring). When the President exercises such authority, he may act even when the measures he takes are “incompatible with the expressed or implied will of Congress.” Id., at 637. The exclusive constitutional authority of the President “dis- abl[es] the Congress from acting upon the subject.” Id., at 637-638. And the courts have “no power to control [the President’s] discretion” when he acts pursuant to the pow- ers invested exclusively in him by the Constitution. Mar- bury, 1 Cranch, at 166.
@realcaseyrollins@social.teci.world @AltonDooley @realcaseyrollins@noauthority.social @volkris @Hyolobrika Please read the separation of powers discussion earlier. I don’t want to repeat myself. 1/
@realcaseyrollins@social.teci.world @AltonDooley @realcaseyrollins@noauthority.social @volkris @Hyolobrika The basis for the portion of the decision regarding DOJ and prosecutorial decisions — it’s in that screenshot! — is that prosecutorial decisions fall under the “‘conclusive and preclusive’ Presidential authority”, which no laws by Congress or acts by courts can regulate, the “special province” of the Executive. 2/
@realcaseyrollins@social.teci.world @AltonDooley @realcaseyrollins@noauthority.social @volkris @Hyolobrika Yes. Every prosecution is allegedly against “defendants who violate the law.” Every Federal prosecution is performed under the President’s authority to “take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed.”
Every *malicious* prosecution alleges a violation of the law, and is pursued under the authority of the “take Care” clause. Every one. 1/
@realcaseyrollins@social.teci.world @AltonDooley @realcaseyrollins@noauthority.social @volkris @Hyolobrika Under this decision, no one, no law, no Court, can review whether any allegation that the law has been broken has any basis. A President and his Attorney General can simply make up an allegation of a violation of law and prosecute it. 2/
@realcaseyrollins@social.teci.world @AltonDooley @realcaseyrollins@noauthority.social @volkris @Hyolobrika As requested, here is the paragraph of the decision that says that. /fin
![Text:
No matter the context, the President’s authority to act necessarily “stem[s] either from an act of Congress or from the Constitution itself.” Youngstown, 343 U. S., at 585. In the latter case, the President’s authority is sometimes “con- clusive and preclusive.” Id., at 638 (Jackson, dJ., concur- ring). When the President exercises such authority, he may act even when the measures he takes are “incompatible with the expressed or implied will of Congress.” Id., at 637. The exclusive constitutional authority of the President “dis- abl[es] the Congress from acting upon the subject.” Id., at 637-638. And the courts have “no power to control [the President’s] discretion” when he acts pursuant to the pow- ers invested exclusively in him by the Constitution. Mar- bury, 1 Cranch, at 166.](media_attachments/files/112/754/128/940/949/409/original/31ad3b47bee1489a.png)
Text: No matter the context, the President’s authority to act necessarily “stem[s] either from an act of Congress or from the Constitution itself.” Youngstown, 343 U. S., at 585. In the latter case, the President’s authority is sometimes “con- clusive and preclusive.” Id., at 638 (Jackson, dJ., concur- ring). When the President exercises such authority, he may act even when the measures he takes are “incompatible with the expressed or implied will of Congress.” Id., at 637. The exclusive constitutional authority of the President “dis- abl[es] the Congress from acting upon the subject.” Id., at 637-638. And the courts have “no power to control [the President’s] discretion” when he acts pursuant to the pow- ers invested exclusively in him by the Constitution. Mar- bury, 1 Cranch, at 166.
@realcaseyrollins@social.teci.world @AltonDooley @realcaseyrollins@noauthority.social @volkris @Hyolobrika No. Prosecutors never know whether crimes have been committed. They allege, based on lesser or greater evidence. The accused is innocent until proven guilty. Prosecutorial decisions are not restricted to which "crimes that have been committed" to prosecute. You've made that up entirely. It's nowhere in the decision, or my screenshot of it, and it couldn't be, since there is no certain crime before the prosecution. 1/
@realcaseyrollins@social.teci.world @AltonDooley @realcaseyrollins@noauthority.social @volkris @Hyolobrika Where in that screenshot (or elsewhere in the decision) do you think you see that kind of restriction? You don't. You are making it up, imputing it. 2/
@realcaseyrollins@social.teci.world @AltonDooley @realcaseyrollins@noauthority.social @volkris @Hyolobrika What distinguished malicious prosecution from other prosecution isn't prosecution where "there is no crime". Malicious prosecution is prosecution where the evidence is weaker than it ordinarily would be to prosecute, or perhaps even nonexistent, motivated for some purpose other than evenhanded enforcement of the law. 3/
@realcaseyrollins@social.teci.world @AltonDooley @realcaseyrollins@noauthority.social @volkris @Hyolobrika The decision protects those prosecutions, because it claims no law from Congress can regulate prosecutorial choices at all, including the motive for those choices, their even-handedness, or their evidentiary basis. 4/
@realcaseyrollins@social.teci.world @AltonDooley @realcaseyrollins@noauthority.social @volkris @Hyolobrika You and @volkris are intent on adding caveats and limitations to the decision that simply do not exist in its text or its logic. It's one way to cope, I guess. /fin
"When I first came to town, I was scandalized by the rumors of off-label prescription drug use on Air Force Force One during George W. Bush’s presidency, but it turns out every administration is like that — not just for POTUS but for senior staff as well — because it’s the only way to do the job."
// this is quite the aside from #MattYglesias, who does i think frequently talk to these people
@realcaseyrollins@social.teci.world @AltonDooley @realcaseyrollins@noauthority.social @volkris @Hyolobrika if it sounds fine and dandy, well your opinion is your prerogative.
But i hope we share an understanding of the holding. Prosecutorial decisions are the sole province of the President, not regulable by Congress' laws. So there can be no such thing as an "illegal" or "invalid" prosecution. The President can prosecute whomever, whyever He chooses, however unfounded or "malicious" the basis for those prosecutions might be.
@realcaseyrollins@social.teci.world @AltonDooley @realcaseyrollins@noauthority.social @volkris @Hyolobrika The President can face no legal accountability for those choices. No public or judicial process can inquire into their motivations, no Congressional act can regulate them in any way.
I think that's pretty fucking scary, and deeply threatening to any social order other than authoritarian tyranny.
@realcaseyrollins@social.teci.world @AltonDooley @realcaseyrollins@noauthority.social @volkris @Hyolobrika But sure. If you think absolute immunity for even malicious prosecution is fine and dandy, you my good friend are just as entitled to your opinion on that as I am to mine.
I am glad we agree on the facts of what was held by the Supreme Court of the United States, one week ago.
@realcaseyrollins@noauthority.social @realcaseyrollins@social.teci.world @AltonDooley @volkris @Hyolobrika OK. Here's the key stuff:
"the Executive Branch has 'exclusive authority and absolute discretion' to decide which crimes to investigate and *prosecute*...Investigative and *prosecutorial* decisionmaking is “the special province of the Executive Branch,”…and the Constitution vests the entirety of the executive power in the President, Art. II, §1… *For that reason,*…" 1/
@realcaseyrollins@noauthority.social @realcaseyrollins@social.teci.world @AltonDooley @volkris @Hyolobrika "Trump’s threatened removal of the Acting Attorney General likewise implicates “conclusive and preclusive” Presidential authority."
The emphasis (the *xxx* signalling italics) is mine. 2/
@realcaseyrollins@noauthority.social @realcaseyrollins@social.teci.world @AltonDooley @volkris @Hyolobrika Note this does not refer merely to discussions. It refers specifically to prosecutions and prosecutorial decisionmaking. The President can decide who to prosecute. The Constitution, Roberts claims, vests all decisionmaking power surrounding prosecutorial choices in the President, as a "special province". *For that reason* it falls within the "'conclusive and preclusive' Presidential authority" + commands absolute immunity. 3/
@realcaseyrollins@noauthority.social @realcaseyrollins@social.teci.world @AltonDooley @volkris @Hyolobrika This is one of the key logical themes of the entire decision: Some Executive authorities are deemed to be shared with Congress, but others to be solely the province of the Executive, personified by the President. Where they read Constitutional authority not to be shared, Congress — the maker of laws — cannot regulate Him. *Not* providing immunity in this sphere, subjecting the President to Congress' laws… 4/
@realcaseyrollins@noauthority.social @realcaseyrollins@social.teci.world @AltonDooley @volkris @Hyolobrika would violate the Constitution's "separation of power" principle, in the Court majority's view. The President has "absolute immunity" in these domains because acts of Congress or the Courts — laws and the infrastructure of their enforcement — simply have no power to reach this "special province", this "conclusive and preclusive' Presidential authority". 5/
@realcaseyrollins@noauthority.social @realcaseyrollins@social.teci.world @AltonDooley @volkris @Hyolobrika And prosecutorial decisions, not just discussions, not just personnel decisions, are proclaimed to be within this domain. Congress and its laws have no authority to regulate whom the President chooses to prosecute, says the majority, so of course Congress' laws can have no authority here. 6/
@realcaseyrollins@noauthority.social @realcaseyrollins@social.teci.world @AltonDooley @volkris @Hyolobrika The domain of prosecutorial decisionmaking, the decision very clearly proclaims, is within the sphere of absolute Presidential immunity that the decision here and elsewhere defines. /fin
@realcaseyrollins@noauthority.social @realcaseyrollins@social.teci.world @AltonDooley @volkris @Hyolobrika Sure.
![(1988) (Scalia, dJ., dissenting)). And the Executive Branch has “exclusive authority and absolute discretion” to decide which crimes to investigate and prosecute, including with respect to allegations of election crime. Nixon, 418 U. S., at 693; see United States v. Texas, 599 U. S. 670, 678-679 (2023) (“Under Article II, the Executive Branch possesses authority to decide ‘how to prioritize and how aggressively to pursue legal actions against defendants who violate the law.”” (quoting TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez, 594 U. S. 413, 429 (2021))). The President may discuss potential investi- gations and prosecutions with his Attorney General and other Justice Department officials to carry out his constitu- tional duty to “take Care that the Laws be faithfully exe- cuted.” Art.II, §3. And the Attorney General, as head of the Justice Department, acts as the President’s “chief law enforcement officer” who “provides vital assistance to [him] in the performance of [his] constitutional duty to ‘preserve, protect, and defend the Constitution.”” Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U. S. 511, 520 (1985) (quoting Art. II, §1, cl. 8).
Investigative and prosecutorial decisionmaking is “the special province of the Executive Branch,” Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U. S. 821, 832 (1985), and the Constitution vests the entirety of the executive power in the President, Art. I1, §1. For that reason, Trump’s threatened removal of the...
(truncated due to character limit. sorry!)](media_attachments/files/112/752/137/132/494/783/original/555e32807463469e.png)
(1988) (Scalia, dJ., dissenting)). And the Executive Branch has “exclusive authority and absolute discretion” to decide which crimes to investigate and prosecute, including with respect to allegations of election crime. Nixon, 418 U. S., at 693; see United States v. Texas, 599 U. S. 670, 678-679 (2023) (“Under Article II, the Executive Branch possesses authority to decide ‘how to prioritize and how aggressively to pursue legal actions against defendants who violate the law.”” (quoting TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez, 594 U. S. 413, 429 (2021))). The President may discuss potential investi- gations and prosecutions with his Attorney General and other Justice Department officials to carry out his constitu- tional duty to “take Care that the Laws be faithfully exe- cuted.” Art.II, §3. And the Attorney General, as head of the Justice Department, acts as the President’s “chief law enforcement officer” who “provides vital assistance to [him] in the performance of [his] constitutional duty to ‘preserve, protect, and defend the Constitution.”” Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U. S. 511, 520 (1985) (quoting Art. II, §1, cl. 8). Investigative and prosecutorial decisionmaking is “the special province of the Executive Branch,” Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U. S. 821, 832 (1985), and the Constitution vests the entirety of the executive power in the President, Art. I1, §1. For that reason, Trump’s threatened removal of the... (truncated due to character limit. sorry!)
@John @GGMcBG An advantage of that is the remainder of the Supreme Court hasn't yet decided on whether Biden would have "absolute" only "at least presumptive" immunity for ordering the armed forces to hold Thomas at Guantanamo. That case might propel them clarify in the direction of "presumptive", and establish limits. 1/
@John @GGMcBG Particularly if John Roberts and Samuel Alito were in Guantanamo as well, a majority Supreme Court decision revisiting these questions might be quite protective of Americans' civil liberties and help get Biden imprisoned for the rest of his long life for what in fact would be an atrocity and abuse of power. /fin
@realcaseyrollins @AltonDooley @volkris @Hyolobrika Yes, but until a week ago, if Presidents used that control to contrive malicious prosecutions, once they became a private citizen they faced risk of prosecution for that crime.
Now they face no such risk, are absolutely and explicitly immunized for whatever they do in directing their DOJ
This decision has *legalized* malicious prosecution for everyone else, ostensibly in order to remedy the possibility of malicious prosecution of a President.
@FeralRobots that's John Roberts I think. Thomas' concurrence comes later.
( yesterday i went through the decisions carefully, which i had only skimmed before, and that very "sometimes" compelled a bit of an embarrassing update. https://drafts.interfluidity.com/2024/07/03/no-longer-a-liberal-democracy/index.html )
"there has been much discussion about ensuring that a President 'is not above the law.' But…the President’s immunity from prosecution for his official acts *is* the law."
— Justice Clarence Thomas
United States Supreme Court
concurring in Trump v. US
@volkris @Hyolobrika @AltonDooley This case *explicitly* grants *absolute* immunity to Presidents for their compelling a justice department to engage in prosecutions, political, malicious, or otherwise.
It does not protect civilians at all, other than the President himself, and those the President pardons.
If Joe Biden hates your grandma and tell Merrick Garland to throw the full weight of the Justice Department into finding dirt to lock her up, the decision IMMUNIZES Biden for that conduct.
@volkris @Hyolobrika @AltonDooley
No. Courts must always throw out cases that are on their face "invalid (malicious or otherwise faulty)". The problem is, when a lawsuit or prosecution occurs, there is often a dispute over whether a suit is "invalid (malicious or otherwise faulty)". 1/
@volkris @Hyolobrika @AltonDooley Courts then must inquire into the dispute as a factual matter.
Immunity is quite distinct.
"The essence of immunity 'is its possessor’s entitlement
not to have to answer for his conduct' in court."
That's John Roberts, from the decision. That is quite distinct from saying Courts must examine a prosecution in any way at all, and dismiss the bad ones. It says Courts have no business examining or evaluating an allegation at all. That is what immunity means. /fin
@volkris read the effing decision. i have read all 119 pages.
the phrase "invalid prosecution" DOES NOT APPEAR.
you are making that up. you are lying, i think not out of malice, but out of hope and misinformation, but i have informed and informed you so it starts to seem just like a lie.
you have eyes and a brain. read.